Step 2: Voting Reform

Step 2: A Free Digital Participation and Voting App

FuturePlan proposes a free and easy-to-use app that can help people in any country learn about public issues, discuss possible solutions and become familiar with voting directly on the decisions that affect their lives.

The app will be developed in two distinct stages. Version 1 will be an educational participation platform using voluntary registration and non-binding opinion polls. A later version may become a binding public voting system, but only after the necessary lawful authority, independent security testing, public scrutiny and electoral safeguards are in place.

Why Begin with an Educational App?

In many countries, people are accustomed to choosing representatives at elections but have fewer opportunities to vote directly on individual laws and public policies. FuturePlan encourages citizens to examine issues, consider different points of view and take greater responsibility for the decisions made in their name.

Version 1 will allow us to begin that process now without pretending that an unofficial poll is a legally binding election. It will also give participants time to become familiar with issue-based voting while the app, its information systems and its public safeguards are tested and improved.

Stage 1: Voluntary Registration and Opinion Polls

Free and Simple Registration

People will be invited to register voluntarily and use the app free of charge. Registration should be quick and straightforward, while still taking reasonable measures to prevent automated accounts and repeated voting by the same participant.

Version 1 will not claim to use or replace any country’s official electoral register. Registration in the app will not mean that a person is enrolled to vote in a national, regional or local government election. Only the minimum personal information reasonably required to operate and protect the service should be collected.

Questions Designed to Encourage Discussion

The app will pose clear questions about national, regional and community issues. Participants will be encouraged to examine the background information, consider arguments for and against each proposal, discuss the consequences and then record their opinion.

The purpose is not merely to count clicks. It is to encourage people to think carefully about how laws and government decisions affect them, their communities and future generations.

What Version 1 Results Will Mean

All Version 1 polls will be clearly labelled non-binding opinion polls. Their results will show the views of registered participants who chose to respond. They will not be described as official election results or as the settled opinion of an entire country or electorate.

Published results should include the number of participants, the dates of the poll and enough information to help readers understand the limits of the result. Poll questions, explanatory material and any material change made during a poll should also be recorded publicly.

Useful Version 1 Features

• A clear list of current and forthcoming issues
• Plain-English background information
• Fairly presented arguments for and against each proposal
• Links to supporting evidence and source documents
• Notifications about new questions and closing dates
• Accessible participation through mobile devices and a secure web interface
• Published results with clear explanations of what they do and do not prove
• Feedback channels to improve the questions, information and app

Preparing for Stage 2

Stage 1 will help develop a culture of informed participation. It will also provide practical experience in accessibility, question presentation, public education, privacy and system reliability.

That experience will help prepare for a later transition to the FuturePlan system, but participation in Version 1 will not automatically make a person eligible for a future binding vote. A binding system will require its own lawful and independently verified voter-registration process.

Stage 2: Binding Digital Voting

When the people of a country have lawfully authorised a system of Citizens Initiated Referendums and continuing public participation, a later version of the app could be adapted to conduct binding votes in that country.

Stage 2 would not be activated simply because the software appears to work. It would require an appropriate legal framework, independent administration, public technical scrutiny, extensive security testing, accessible alternatives and convincing evidence that every binding result can be verified.

The Right Comes Before the Technology

Step 1 establishes the people’s democratic right to initiate and decide public proposals. Step 2 provides a practical way to exercise that right. The right must not depend upon one company, one application or one particular technology.

Blockchain technology may be evaluated as one component because it can provide a distributed, tamper-evident record. However, blockchain alone cannot prove that a voter’s device was safe, that a ballot was recorded as intended or that a voter acted without pressure. The complete system must be judged by what it can independently prove, not by the name of the technology it uses.

Requirements for a Binding Voting System

• Eligibility: only eligible voters may participate in a binding vote.
• Equal voting power: the system must prevent duplicated or unauthorised votes while applying the approved rules equally.
• Ballot secrecy: no government, administrator, developer or other person should be able to connect a voter with their final choice.
• Accurate recording: the system must provide evidence that each ballot was captured and included as the voter intended.
• Independent verification: authorised independent auditors must be able to verify the result without relying upon assurances from the app’s operator.
• No vote-selling receipt: a voter may verify that an anonymous ballot was included, but must not receive proof of the choice that could be sold or shown to a coercer.
• Accessibility: voters with disabilities, limited technical experience or no suitable device must still be able to participate privately and independently.
• Resilience: the system must continue safely or recover predictably during outages, cyberattacks, disasters and telecommunications failures.
• Dispute resolution: the law must provide a way to preserve evidence, challenge a result and order a recount or repeat vote when necessary.

Separating Identity from the Secret Ballot

A binding system must confirm that a person is eligible to vote without recording how that person voted. Identity verification and ballot recording must therefore be separated by design.

The voter-registration service could issue a secure anonymous voting credential after eligibility is confirmed. The voting service would accept the credential without receiving the voter’s identity. No single database or administrator should hold enough information to reconnect a secret ballot with the person who cast it.

Secure device authentication may help protect a voter’s credential. However, a central biometric database should not be required, and voters must have a practical non-biometric way to authenticate and recover access.

Verification, Auditing and Public Trust

Security must be demonstrated, not merely promised. The rules, technical standards and important parts of the system should be available for independent examination. Qualified organisations and researchers should be able to test the system and report weaknesses responsibly before it is trusted with binding public decisions.

• Independent security reviews before every binding voting period
• Publicly documented voting and counting rules
• Protected audit records that are independent of the main software
• Public verification of the final count without revealing individual choices
• Strict controls preventing one person or organisation from secretly controlling the system
• Transparent disclosure and correction of discovered faults
• Limited trials and parallel testing before any national binding use

Australian example: read how the Australian Electoral Commission protects transparency and scrutiny in federal elections. Each country would need safeguards appropriate to its own electoral laws and institutions.

Reducing Coercion and Vote Buying

Voting away from a supervised polling place creates a risk that another person may pressure a voter, control their device or offer payment for a particular choice.

One possible protection is to allow a voter to change a digital ballot before voting closes, with only the final valid ballot being counted. A person pressured into making an earlier choice could later vote privately. A supervised in-person vote could also be permitted to override a remote vote.

These measures can reduce coercion, but no remote system can claim to eliminate it completely. The final design must be tested carefully and must never give voters proof showing another person how they voted.

Security Beyond the Blockchain

A secure record is only one part of a secure election. The system must also be designed for compromised phones, fraudulent copies of the app, stolen credentials, malicious software, dishonest insiders, supply-chain attacks and attempts to prevent people from voting.

No individual developer, system administrator, government department or private company should possess enough authority to alter a result secretly. Critical responsibilities and security keys should be divided among independent custodians, with every sensitive action recorded and subject to review.

There must also be a secure and prompt process for people who lose a device, change a telephone number, forget their credentials or believe their account has been compromised.

Read the National Academies’ discussion of election security and the limits of internet and blockchain voting.

Participation Must Not Depend on Owning a Smartphone

Every eligible person must have a secure and accessible way to vote. A future binding system should therefore retain supervised voting centres and provide appropriate postal, mobile, telephone or assisted services where required. Contingency arrangements must also exist when devices, internet services or electricity are unavailable.

Alternative voting methods must apply the same principles of eligibility, ballot secrecy, auditing and equal voting power as the digital system.

Australian example: read about the voting options provided by the Australian Electoral Commission. Other countries can apply the same principle of offering secure and accessible alternatives according to local needs.

A Possible Future National Prosperity Payment

The AB Coin

FuturePlan proposes the AB Coin, a gold-backed digital coin, as the foundation of the new monetary system. It is intended to provide people with a practical means of holding and exchanging value within the FuturePlan framework.

Development of the AB Coin is already being planned so that it will be ready for rollout during Stage 1. Further details about its operation will be released when the system is ready to be introduced.

The AB Coin will remain separate from voting. A person’s financial activity must never reveal their ballot choices or political opinions, and access to the monetary system must never depend upon how—or whether—a person votes.

FuturePlan envisages the AB Coin eventually becoming a lawfully recognised national or complementary currency that could be adapted for everyday purchases and business transactions. Backed by gold, it is intended to reduce dependence on centrally controlled money and return greater monetary control to the people. Each country would need to examine its own constitution, currency laws, financial obligations and economic conditions before adopting such a system. The objective is to help a nation’s currency support productive development, independence and the priorities its people choose for their future.

A Careful and Practical Transition

FuturePlan will begin by inviting people to participate voluntarily, learn about issues and record their opinions in clearly identified non-binding polls. This will encourage informed discussion and help improve the app without claiming legal authority it does not yet possess.

As participation and understanding grow, the technical, legal and institutional foundations for Stage 2 can be developed openly. Binding digital voting should begin in a country only when its people have lawfully authorised it and independent evidence shows that the system protects eligibility, secrecy, accessibility and the integrity of every result.

Technology must serve democracy. It must never ask the people to surrender their trust to a system they cannot examine, challenge or verify.

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